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Presbyterian, Anglican, Thomist, or Deist? 
Does It Matter? 
Mark D. Hall 
James Wilson is buried in America 's Westminster Abby-Christ 
Church, Philadelphia. This Anglican church is only blocks away from 
the First Presbyterian church in Philadelphia, where Wilson rented a 
pew until the end of his life. Some scholars report that Wilson joined 
the Anglican Communion in 1778, perhaps at the behest of one his 
best friends , William White, the first Anglican bishop of Philadelphia. 
Others claim he that never abandoned the Presbyterianism of his na-
tive Scotland. Still others pay no attention to his denominational com-
mitments, arguing that he was actually a Thornist or a deist. Finally, 
some scholars say nothing about his religious identification or beliefs, 
apparently concluding that these things are unrelated to his political 
and legal accomplishments. 
It is a central thesis of this book, and of this chapter, that religion 
does matter. It matters for a number of reasons, but with respect to 
politics it is particularly significant because the most interesting polit-
ical questions are ultimately moral questions, and most peoples' 
moral views are tied to their religious commitments. Even if political 
actors are not themselves religious (and many of them have been), 
they have been forced to take into account tl1e religious sensibilities 
of the people they represent or govern. This is particularly true with 
respect to America, where religion-specifically, Christianity-has 
been central to our political tradition. It is certainly true in the case of 
James Wilson. 
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BIOGRAPHY 
James Wilson was born in Carskerdo, Scotland, in 1742, the son of a 
lower-middle-class farmer. Dedicated to the ministry at birth, he re-
ceived an uncommonly good classical education that enabled him to 
win a scholarship to the University of St. Andrews. Wilson studied 
there for four years before entering the university's divinity school, St. 
Mary's, in 1761. He was forced to withdraw in 1762 upon the death of 
his father, and for a few years served as a tutor to support his family. 
The life of a pedagogue did not suit Wilson, so as soon as his siblings 
were old enough to support their mother, he immigrated to America 
in search of greater opportunities. Arriving in Pennsylvania in 1765, 
Wilson taught Latin and Greek at the College of Philadelphia for a 
year before reading law under John Dickinson. He flourished as a 
lawyer and, as the Revolution approached, was drawn into politics. 
Wilson achieved national recognition in 1774 with the publication 
of "Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Au-
thority of the British Parliament," the first essay to argue that Ameri-
cans had absolutely no obligation to obey Parliament. He was able to 
put his theory of resistance into practice after he was appointed to the 
Continental Congress in 1775. He became an important participant in 
the debates over the controversy with Great Britain, and eventually 
cast the tie-breaking vote in the Pennsylvania delegation in favor of 
independence. 
Wilson was one of the eight framers of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence to attend the Constitutional Convention, and one of only six to 
sign both documents. Among the few delegates to attend the con-
vention from start to finish, he participated in all of the most signifi-
cant proceedings. He spoke more times (168) than any other member, 
save Gouverneur Morris, and was a member of the impottant Com-
mittee of Detail. His contributions have led scholars as diverse as 
James Bryce, Randolph G. Adams, Max Farrand, Ralph Ketcham, Adri-
enne Koch, Clinton Rossiter, Samuel Beer, and Paul Johnson to agree 
that Wilson was second only to James Madison, and was perhaps on 
a par with him, in terms of influence on the Constitution. 1 
Under Wilson's leadership, Pennsylvania became the second state, 
and the first large one, to ratify the Constitution. As the only member 
of the state's ratifying convention to have attended the federal con-
vention, Wilson was in an excellent position to defend the Constitu-
tion. He began his defense with his "State House Yard Speech," an ad-
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dress that soon became, according to Gordon Wood, "the basis of all 
Federalist thinking. "2 By the end of 1787, the speech had been 
reprinted in thirty-four newspapers in twelve states, and it was circu-
lated in pamphlet form throughout the former colonies.3 According to 
Bernard Bailyn, "in the 'transient circumstances' of the time it was not 
so much the Federalist papers that captured most people's imagina-
tions as James Wilson's speech of October 6, 1787, the most famous, 
to some the most notorious, federalist statement of the time."4 Fol-
lowing the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, Wilson played a major 
role in the Pennsylvania constitutional convention of 1789-1790.5 
Wilson was appointed associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
1789. Although the Court heard relatively few cases during his tenure, 
he wrote notable opinions in Hylton v. US. (1796), Ware v. Hylton 
(1796), Wiscart v. D'Auchy (1796), and Chisholm v. Georgia 0793). 
His most significant opinion was issued while riding circuit in 1792. In 
Hayburn 's case, Wilson led Justice John Blair and district court judge 
Richard Peters to declare Congress's Invalid Pension Act of 1792 to be 
unconstitutional. Because Congress rapidly altered the act to meet his 
objections, and because the Supreme Court never issued an opinion, 
the case is often overlooked as the first instance where a federal court 
declared an act of Congress to be unconstitutiona1.6 
Wilson's most significant contribution to American jurisprudence 
took place off the Court. From 1790 to 1792 he gave a series of law 
lectures at the College of Philadelphia. Because he believed that law 
should be "studied and practised as a science founded in principle" 
not "followed as a trade depending merely upon precedent," many of 
his lectures are devoted to broad moral, epistemological, and political 
issues.l Consequently, they contain some of the most explicitly theo-
retical analysis of America's constitutional order by one who played a 
central role in its formation .8 
Wilson was never able to revise his lectures into the definitive trea-
tise on American law that he desired (they were, however, edited and 
published by his son, Bird Wilson, in 1804).9 In 1798 an economic 
downturn devastated an overleveraged Wilson, who had begun spec-
ulating in western land in the early 1770s. Thrown into jail on two 
separate occasions, he spent his final days hiding from creditors in a 
tavern in Edenton, North Carolina. There, he contracted malaria and 
died on August 21, 1798. He was buried with little ceremony in Eden-
ton, where his body remained until it was reburied at Christ Church 
in 1906. 
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THE LITERATURE 
Throughout the twentieth century, scholars have had a tendency to 
dismiss many of the founders ' religious claims as rhetorical flourish. 
In a similar manner, many recent students of Wilson ignore his clear, 
consistent, and systematic appeals to God, generally, and Christian 
natural law theory, more specifically. A good example of this is Rod-
erick Hills's 1989 article "The Reconciliation of Law and Liberty in 
James Wilson," in which Hills argues that the primary purpose of Wil-
son's law lectures was to synthesize "Grotius's notion of natural lib-
erty or perfect justice with the ancient Stoic notion of natural law or 
distributive justice."10 This thesis is not patently unreasonable, but it is 
troubling that Hills refuses to defend his assertion that Wilson's con-
ception of natural liberty or law was completely secular.11 He simply 
ignores Wilson's clear statements that natural law is based on God. 
More significantly, given the thesis of his article, Hills does not even 
discuss Wilson's claim that Grotius weakened international law by re-
moving it from its natural law foundation.12 
Like Hills, other recent Wilson scholars, including Stephen Conrad, 
Jennifer Nedelsky, Shannon Stimson, and Samuel Beer, ignore his re-
liance on a traditional Christian conception of natural law.13 In doing 
so, these authors neglect some of Wilson's most important and inter-
esting views. For instance, none of them even refers to his claim that 
Congress is limited by "natural or revealed law" and his strong impli-
cation that the Supreme Court can strike down a statute on the basis 
of this law. It is possible, of course, to argue that Wilson was confused 
or not serious when he made these statements, but these scholars do 
not make this argument. 14 
Far more surprising, writers who believe that America had a "Chris-
tian Founding" and who claim that virtually every founder was an or-
thodox Christian have either ignored Wilson or have questioned his 
orthodoxy. For instance, John Eidsmoe provides a detailed treatment 
of thirteen founders in Christianity and the Constitution, where he 
classifies George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madi-
son as "strong Christians," but does not even consider Wilson, even 
though the latter had more influence on the Constitution than any 
founder besides Madison. 15 More to the point, M. E. Bradford notes in 
A Worthy Company that fifty to fifty-three of the fifty-five authors of 
the Constitution were orthodox Christians, definitively leaving out 
only Hugh Williamson (a heterodox Presbyterian who speculated 
Mark D. Hall 185 
about unfallen men who lived on comets) and Wilson (who, he al-
lows, might have been a deist, but "was probably a free thinker in the 
privacy of his study"). 16 
Although recent scholars have tended to dismiss or ignore Wilson's 
religious language, this has not always been the case. Randolph G. 
Adams, in the preface to his 1930 collection of Wilson's writings, noted 
the similarities between Wilson and St. Thomas Aquinas and suggested 
that further study of this connection might prove fruitful. 17 This claim 
prompted a number of Catholic scholars to look at Wilson. Pioneering 
work in this regard was done by May G. O'Donnell, who published 
her findings in a 1937 book, james Wilson and the Natural Law Basis 
of Positive Law. More significant, and far more theoretically sophisti-
cated, was William F. Obering's 1938 work, The Philosophy of Law of 
james Wilson . He contends that "Wilson was a convinced theist and 
bases the whole system of law on God, the Creator, an all-wise, and 
benevolent Providence of the universe." 18 Obering argues that this 
commitment provided Wilson with a "solid metaphysical foundation 
under his ethics in general and his jurisprudence in patticular."19 Once 
such a base was established, it was possible for Wilson to build a com-
prehensive theory of government and law. Obering ends his work 
with the conclusion that Wilson was effectively a Thomist. 20 
For thirty years after the publication of Father Obering's book, Neo-
Scholastic scholars published an impressive number of doctoral dis-
settations, articles, and books arguing that Wilson was a serious nat-
ural law theorist. 21 Few of these works were theoretically 
sophisticated or added anything new to Obering's interpretation. One 
exception to this rule, Francis De Sales Powell's 1951 dissertation, "A 
Thomistic Evaluation of] ames Wilson and Thomas Reid," takes issue 
with Obering's attempt to reconcile Wilson's use of both Scottish 
moral-sense theory and Thomism. However, this work is never cited 
in the literature on Wilson. 22 In fact , other than Obering's book, it is 
rare to find any of these works cited by contemporary scholars. The 
main reason for this seems to be that Neo-Scholastic authors primarily 
wrote in Neo-Scholastic forums, where they could make assumptions 
that were unpopular in the general academy. Thus, they wrote pri-
marily for themselves and had little influence on mainstream scholar-
ship of the founding era, in general, or, more specifically, on Wilson 
scholarship. 
One does not need to be a Thomist to conclude that Wilson em-
braced a Christian conception of natural law. For instance, Robert G. 
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McCloskey, the great student of American political thought and editor 
of Wilson's papers, noted, 
Among the several things that might be emphasized about this Wilsonian con-
cept of natural law, perhaps the most important are its explicitly deistic origin 
and its normative quality. This is not the secularized natural law of some eigh-
teenth century rationalists nor is it merely a morally indifferent rule of necessity 
like the "laws" of motion. It is God's ordainment, and it imposes ethical duties 
on men and on states2 3 
In my 1997 book, The Political and Legal Philosophy of james Wil-
son, I argue that both McCloskey and Neo-Scholastics were correct in 
recognizing the importance of Wilson's appeals to the Christian natu-
ral law tradition. No substantive claim of my book has been attacked 
by reviewers of the book as much as this one. Most notably, David 
Thomas Konig, Stephen Conrad, and Gary McDowell have criticized 
my interpretation in book reviews. 24 However, like the scholars men-
tioned above who reject the importance of Wilson's appeals to the 
Christian natural law tradition, they offer no arguments to support 
their criticism. 25 On the other hand, several scholars have suggested 
that a major strength of my book is that I take Wilson's Christian nat-
ural law teachings seriously26 
The only academic to publish a substantive critique of the idea that 
Wilson was a serious Christian natural law theorist, in both his review 
of my book and in his own article on Wilson, is Eduardo Velasquez.27 
He argues that sophisticated scholars can carefully read between the 
lines of Wilson's "Christian" rhetoric to find that for him, "human hap-
piness or pleasure is the foundation of the naturallaw."28 Moreover, 
Wilson's emphasis on self-preservation and acceptance of consent 
theory help to demonstrate that he does not adhere to the Christian 
natural law tradition. Instead, Velasquez argues that he embraced a 
modern theory of natural rights grounded primarily in self-interest, al-
beit one ameliorated by his affirmation of human sociability.29 
Wilson clearly and consistently appealed to Christian principles 
throughout his works, something particularly evident and relevant 
with respect to his natural law theory. Given this reality, why do most 
contemporary students of Wilson ignore or refuse to take seriously his 
religious views? I believe that there are three major answers to this 
question. First, all too many academics remain convinced that intelli-
gent people are not religious. Hence, it follows that the religious lan-
guage of an obviously intelligent person like Wilson must be merely 
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rhetorical. Second, some scholars who respect religion or are reli-
gious themselves believe modern liberalism is so antithetical to reli-
gion that when they conclude that Wilson is a liberal, they automati-
cally dismiss his religious language as window dressing. Finally, some 
scholars are so desirous of finding a new, more interesting, interpre-
tation of Wilson that they see little reason to resuscitate a seventy-
year-old interpretation (even in part) and favor a new reading of Wil-
son more in accord with current scholarly trends. 
Of course, few scholars would admit to adhering to the first or third 
reasons for neglecting Wilson's Christian theory of natural law, and I 
do not mean to question the good faith of any specific scholar I have 
mentioned. Moreover, I should make it clear that I believe a student 
of Wilson could legitimately conclude that he was not sincere about 
his religious/ moral beliefs without fitting into any of the above three 
categories. However, as I argue below, there is a strong prima facie 
case that important elements of Wilson's political and legal philoso-
phy rely on explicitly Christian principles. If scholars want to deny 
this, they should, at a minimum, provide arguments for their position. 
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND DENOMINATION COMMITMENTS 
Wilson was raised a Scottish Presbyterian, he studied to become a 
Presbyterian minister, and his best biographer, Page Smith, wrote that 
he "could never bring himself to abandon completely the forms and 
doctrines of his parents' church. "30 Similarly, William B. Miller, relying 
on church archives, documented that Wilson was a member of the 
governing board of the Presbyterian church of Carlisle in 1773 and 
that he made regular contributions to, and rented a pew from, the 
First Presbyterian Church of Philadelphia from 1778 until his death in 
1798.31 Nevertheless, it is not clear that Wilson remained an active 
member of the church of his youth throughout his entire life. 
Shortly after arriving in America, Wilson became fast friends with 
William White, who later became the first Anglican bishop of 
Philadelphia. In 1768, the two friends wrote a series of newspaper ar-
ticles for the Pennsylvania Chronicle and Universal Advertiser.32 
Around this time, Page Smith suggested that White had almost con-
vinced Wilson to become an Anglican, but that he did not succeed. 33 
However, L. ]. Trinterud, in his book on early American Presbyteri-
anism, claimed that Wilson left the Presbyterian Church in 1782.34 
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Moreover, several scholars have stated that Wilson became an Epis-
copalian, and Deborah Gough even specifies that he joined Christ 
Church in 1778.35 However, none of these authors offer any evidence 
to support their claims. 
To referee between these competing claims, I examined the pew 
rental records and other documents for Christ Church, Philadelphia. I 
found no mention of Wilson or his family until March 1794, where he 
is recorded as renting three seats on the front row of the church's 
gallery. The seats cost approximately seven pounds per year, and his 
accounts were paid in full until the end of his life. Interestingly, the 
account warden continued to charge Wilson's estate for the pew un-
til 1801 when his son, Bird, paid the accumulated debt and took over 
the pew in his own name.36 
Of course, renting a pew may say little about Wilson's actual com-
mitments (after all, Wilson apparently rented pews at two different 
churches between 1794 and 1798, and founders like Benjamin 
Franklin rented a pew from Christ Church). Other evidence, however, 
suggests that Wilson's conversion was more than window dressing. 
For instance, his son, Bird, who later became an Episcopalian priest, 
noted in his biography of William White that he had been raised un-
der White's "pastoral care."37 As well, Wilson had his last son, Henry, 
baptized at Christ Church soon after his birth in 1796.38 On balance, 
the evidence strongly suggests that James Wilson became an active 
Episcopalian in 1794. 
Denominational commitments are not unimportant, but more signif-
icant for our purpose is the extent to which Wilson's Christian beliefs 
influenced his political philosophy and, hence, his contributions to the 
creation of the American republic. Rather than attempt to summarize 
all of his beliefs that influenced his political views and actions, I shall 
focus on his acceptance of Christian natural law theory. This focus is 
justified in light of the significance of natural law for Wilson's political 
theory and actions. It also allows me to document my claim in some 
detail, making it difficult for skeptics to claim that I am basing my ar-
gument on isolated or unimportant passages from Wilson's works. 
WILSON'S THEORY OF NATURAL LAW 
The Neo-Scholastic interest in Wilson discussed above is somewhat 
ironic as Wilson was a lifelong Protestant who never cited St. Thomas 
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Aquinas, and his references to the Catholic Church or, particularly, 
popes, were often negative. 39 However, throughout his works, and 
particularly in his law lectures, Wilson clearly, consistently, and sys-
tematically appealed to the Christian natural law tradition. 
He began his law lectures by focusing on the theoretical basis of 
law, noting that "to direct the more important patts of our conduct, 
the bountiful Governour of the universe has been graciously pleased 
to provide us with a law; and that, to direct the less important parts of 
it, he has made us capable of providing a law for ourselves. "4° Fol-
lowing Richard Hooker, who in turn borrowed from St. Thomas 
Aquinas, he divided the first type of law, which he called "divine law," 
into four "species. "41 
The first species of divine law, "eternal law," concerns God's eter-
nal plan for the universe.42 Wilson's understanding of the second 
species of law, "celestial law," came directly from Richard Hooker's 
Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity. Like Hooker, he believed that ce-
lestial law governs men and angels in the "celestial and perfect state." 
Accordingly, it is not clear to men in the present state because they 
can see it "but darkly, and as through a glass."43 The third species of 
divine law is comprised of physical laws by which "the irrational and 
inanimate parts of the creation are governed." He explained that the 
"great Creator of all things has established general and fixed rules, ac-
cording to which all the phenomena of the material universe are pro-
duced and regulated. " The science whereby these laws may be 
known is called natural philosophy. 44 
The fomth type of divine law is "that law which God has made for 
man in his present state. " There are several manifestations of this law: 
As promulgated by reason and the moral sense, it has been called natural; as 
promulgated by the holy scriptures, it has been called revealed law. 
As addressed to men, it has been denominated the law of nature; as ad-
dressed to political societies, it has been denominated the law of nations. 
But it should always be remembered, that this law, natural or revealed, made 
for men or for nations, flows from the same divine source: it is the law of God.45 
Wilson contended that because God created the world and has "in-
finite power-infinite wisdom-and infinite goodness," he has 
"supreme right to prescribe a law for our conduct, and that we are un-
der the most perfect obligation to obey that law. "46 Similarly, he stated 
several times that our obligation to obey natural law is rooted in the 
"will of God. "47 
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Wilson argued that God's laws are always good. Negatively, they 
prevent "chaos and disorder. "48 Positively, they promote the happi-
ness of men and women. He contended, 
Being infinitely and eternally happy in himself, his goodness alone could move 
him to create us, and give us the means of happiness. The same principle that 
moved his creating, moves his governing power. The rule of his government we 
shall find to be reduced to this one paternal command-Let man pursue his 
own perfection and happiness 4 9 
Wilson's connection of God's laws to happiness have led some schol-
ars to conclude that he was a utilitarian or a Hobbesian natural-rights 
theorist. Yet, in the context of his lectures, Wilson is no more a utilitar-
ian or modern natural-right theorist than St. Thomas, who also con-
nected God's natural law to human perfection and human happiness .50 
God's moral laws may be known through the "reason, conscience, 
and the holy scriptures. "51 Because humans are made in the image of 
God, and because Wilson's view of the Fall was more Catholic than 
Calvinist, he did not see anything contradictory in arguing that natu-
ral law could be known through reflecting on one's nature. More than 
once he quoted St. Paul's claim that natural law is "engraven by God 
on the hearts of men."52 Moreover, one can learn much about God's 
laws from studying nature. Sounding like St. Thomas, he noted, 
When we view the inanimate and irrational creation around and above us, and 
contemplate the beautiful order observed in all its motions and appearances; is it 
not the supposition unnatural and improbable-that the rational and moral world 
should be abandoned to the frolicks of chance, or to the ravage of disorder?53 
Wilson believed that every human has a moral sense that provides 
knowledge of the first principles of morality. Such knowledge allows 
men and women to resolve most moral problems, but it is occasion-
ally necessary to reason from first principles to solve particular prob-
lems. Moreover, one's moral sense, and even the moral sense of a so-
ciety, may become com1pt through disuse, faulty education, or bad 
laws. Thus, it is not surprising that people have moral disagreements 
and that some cultures accept practices that are considered immoral 
by people in other cultures. Even so, careful consideration will show 
that people and cultures agree on moral issues far more often than 
they disagree. As people come to understand the requirements of nat-
urallaw, it may be said to progress. In Wilson's words, "the law of na-
ture, though immutable in its principles, will be progressive in its op-
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erations and effects. " He was quite clear that it is only our knowledge 
of the natural law that changes, not the natural law itself.54 
The second great class of law, human law, "must rest its authority, 
ultimately, upon the authority of that law which is divine."55 It may be 
divided into two species: "1. That which a political society makes for 
itself. This is municipal law. 2. That which two or more, political so-
cieties make for themselves. This is the voluntary law of nations. "56 
Municipal law includes the civil and criminal laws made by legisla-
tures for the governing of society. In creating these laws, legislators 
must remain cognizant of "the very close and interesting connexion, 
which subsists between the law of nature and municipal law."57 He 
emphasized that human laws should be "an emanation from the law 
of nature and morality." If they are not, they are void. 58 
The second species of human law is the "law of nature, when ap-
plied to states or political societies." Wilson examined this law, now 
commonly referred to as international law, in detail. In doing so he 
became, according to Randolph G. Adams, the first American to write 
systematically about the law of nations. He approached the subject by 
critiquing the views of two of the giants of international law, Hugo 
Grotius and Samuel von Pufendorf. Most significant for our purposes, 
Wilson was highly critical of Grotius for depriving the law of nations 
of the "greatest part of its obligatory force" by removing the idea that 
it is based on natural law, which is based upon "the will of God."59 
NATURAL RIGHTS 
According to Brian Tierney, thinkers in the Christian natural law tra-
dition have derived natural rights from natural laws since at least the 
twelfd1 centmy.60 Similarly, scholars such as Clinton Rossiter have ar-
gued that many of the founders relied on "natural law as the source 
of natural rights. "61 This is clearly the case with Wilson, who referred 
to the "rights, to which we are entitled by the supreme and uncon-
trollable laws of nature" and argued that natural rights are simply 
rights individuals are "entitled" to "by nature and nature's law."62 
Over the last fifty years, a number of scholars, particularly those in-
fluenced by Leo Strauss, have argued that thinkers such as Thomas 
Hobbes and John Locke fundamentally altered traditional Christian 
natural law theory while retaining some of its language. Instead of re-
lying on God as the source of natural law, they adopted a theory of 
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natural rights based on self-interest. Many of these scholars agree that 
this theory was prevalent among American elites in the founding era. 
This tradition has encouraged some scholars to attribute such views 
to Wilson, in spite of his pervasive Christian natural law rhetoric.63 
No one has made this case with respect for Wilson more clearly than 
Eduardo Velasquez. In doing so, he focuses much attention on Wil-
son's claim that "the defense of one's self, [is) justly called the primary 
law of nature."64 While this quotation does have a Hobbesian flavor, in 
the context of all of Wilson's writings on natural law, it is more likely 
that Wilson's view of self-preservation and its place in his moral sys-
tem was no more Hobbesian than similar views offered by St. Thomas 
in Summa Tbeologica (I, II, Q. 94, a. 2) or by Cicero in Pro Milone, 
which Wilson cited and quoted from in support of the above quota-
tion.65 In fact , Velasquez attempts to ameliorate his claim regarding 
Wilson's natural-rights theory by arguing that he borrowed from Scot-
tish notions of human sociability66 But Wilson's view of rights is bet-
ter understood in light of the Christian natural law tradition. 
Wilson thought that because natural rights are based on natural law, 
they exist prior to government. Being ultimately grounded in God, 
they must always be respected. The protection of natural rights is the 
first task of government. Wilson rhetorically asked, 
What was the primary and principal object in the institution of government? Was 
it-I speak of the primary and principal object-was it to acquire new rights by 
a human establishment? Or was it, by a human establishment, to acquire a new 
security for the possession or the recovery of those rights , to the enjoyment or 
acquisition of which we were previously entitled by the immediate gift, or by 
the unetTing law, of our all-wise and all-beneficent Creator?ii7 
For him it was clearly the latter. 
Wilson provided an extensive discussion of the nature and scope of 
natural rights in his law lecture entitled "Of the Natural Rights of In-
dividuals." Among other things, he argued that an individual has a 
"natural right to his property, to his character, to liberty, and to 
safety."68 Although all of these are worthy of discussion, I focus here 
on his view of the right to life and liberty as they most clearly demon-
strate the close connection between natural law and natural rights. 
When discussing liberty, Wilson rejected the extreme, individualis-
tic brand of freedom envisioned by many modern liberals. Instead, 
he taught that liberty must always be understood within the limits 
placed on it by moral and civil law. He noted. "Without liberty, law 
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loses its nature and its name, and becomes oppression. Without law, 
liberty also loses its nature and its name, and becomes licentious-
ness." This concept was so important to Wilson that he quoted a sim-
ilar dictum from Cicero as the epigraph for his law lectures: Lex Ju-
namentum est libertatits, qua fruimur. Legum omnes seroi sum us, 
ut liberi esse possimus.69 
In the state of nature, there is no civil law, so liberty is limited only 
by natural law. In civil society men and women are still required to 
obey the latter, but they are also bound by positive laws. Wilson con-
ceded that "by the municipal law, some things may be prohibited, 
which are not prohibited by the law of nature. "70 Yet, restrictions may 
not violate the natural rights of a person, and they must clearly bene-
fit the public. Although Wilson did not provide a detailed discussion 
regarding what sott of regulations would be acceptable, it seems clear 
that he was referring either to minor restrictions, such as requiring 
drivers to drive on the right side of the road, or more significant re-
strictions in times of extreme danger, such as conscription during 
times of war. It is evident, however, that he had confidence that un-
der a just government, individuals would be freer than they were in a 
state of nature. There is no reason to doubt his sincerity when he 
claimed that 
under a government which is wise and good, every citizen will gain more lib-
eity than he can lose by these prohibitions. He will gain more by the limitation 
of other men's freedom, than he can lose by the diminution of his own. He will 
gain more by the enlarged and undisturbed exercise of his natural libe1ty in in-
numerable instances, than he can lose by the restriction of it in a few71 
Wilson had a fairly expansive conception of the scope of liberty 
protected by natural law. This is best illustrated by his discussion of 
freedom of conscience, or, in his words, "rights of conscience invio-
late. "72 He contended, 
The right of private judgment is one of the greatest advantages of mankind; and 
is always considered as such. To be deprived of it is insufferable. To enjoy it lays 
a foundation for that peace of mind, which the laws cannot give, and for the loss 
of which the laws can offer no compensation 7 3 
Because individuals must be free to make their own choices, Wilson 
supported the general freedom of an individual to "act according to 
his own inclination" if he "does no injury to others" and if "more pub-
lick interests do not demand his labours."74 It is not clear exactly how 
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far Wilson was ready to extend this principle, but at a minimum he 
certainly meant that the government should not interfere with an in-
dividual's liberty to think and believe what he wants. This was partic-
ularly true in matters of religion. 
Given the centrality of Christianity for Wilson's political theory, it is 
important to emphasize that he was a strong advocate of religious lib-
erty. In his inaugural law lecture, for instance, after he praised Locke's 
work on religious toleration, he reminded his audience that a law in 
favor of freedom of religion had been passed in Maryland as early as 
1649. He then noted with pride that when Lord Baltimore was urged 
to repeal the law, "with the enlightened principles of a man and a 
Christian, he had the fortitude to declare, that he never would assent 
to the repeal of a law, which protected the natural rights of men, by 
ensuring every one freedom of action and thought."75 Moreover, Wil-
son did not restrict his conception of liberty to matters of the heart 
and mind. He fully supported the right of the people "to speak, to 
write, to print, and to publish freely ." Yet, he believed each of these 
rights to have limits, as indicated by his support of laws against libel 
and slander. 76 
Wilson embraced a thoroughly Christian view of the right to life. He 
explained, with evident approval, 
With consistency, beautiful and undeviating, human life, from its commence-
ment to its close, is protected by the common law. In the contemplation of the 
law, life begins when the infant is first able stir in the womb. By the law, life is 
protected not only from immediate destruction, but from eve1y degree of actual 
violence, and in some cases, from eve1y degree of danger77 
On the basis of this principle, Wilson criticized ancient societies, 
such as Sparta, Athens, China, and Rome, for the practice of exposing 
or killing unwanted infants. He also condemned the "gentle Hindoo" 
who "is laudably averse to the shedding of blood; but he carries his 
worn out friend and benefactor to perish on the banks of the 
Ganges."78 He justified laws against crimes such as "assault, " "battety," 
"rape," and "homicide" because these actions violate this right. 79 
The right to life was very irnpottant to Wilson. From the womb to 
one's natural death, it must be protected. The high value he placed on 
life came from his view of its origin. In his most famous Supreme Court 
opinion, he noted, "MAN, fearfully and wonderfully made, is the work-
manship of his all perfect CREATOR."80 The implications of this are sig-
nificant. For instance, when writing on suicide, he explained that 
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it was not by his own voluntary act that the man made his appearance upon the 
theatre of life; he cannot, therefore, plead the right of the nation, by his own vol-
untaty act to make his exit. He did not make; therefore, he has no right to de-
stroy himself. He alone, whose gift this state of existence is, has d1e right to say 
when and how it shall receive its termination81 
Life is a gift from God, and it must be protected. For this reason nat-
l}ral law prevents individuals from killing or attacking each other, al-
though it allows for death as a punishment for particularly horrible 
crimes. If a person is sentenced to death, however, Wilson made it 
clear · in a grand jury charge that "an interval should be permitted to 
elapse before [the sentence's] execution, as will render the language 
of political expediency consonant to the language of religion."82 
Wilson's view of natural rights was firmly based upon his theory of 
natural law. Because rights are based upon God's universal and ab-
solute law, they must always be respected. Such a theory helped Wil-
son to justify the colonies' revolt against England, and it played an im-
portant role in his contributions to the creation of the American 
republic.83 Yet, the rights of individuals are limited by the natural law 
upon which they are founded. Wilson clearly rejected the extreme in-
dividualistic view of rights that would come to dominate American 
political theory and law.84 
RELEVANCE AND IMPACT 
Wilson's view of rights is relevant today as scholars attempt to un-
derstand the founders ' views of the nature and limits of the rights 
protected by the Constitution and Bill of Rights . Although he was 
not immediately involved in writing or ratifying the Bill of Rights, 
given his significant role in writing, ratifying, and interpreting the 
U.S. Constitution and his influence on American law through his law 
lectures, Wilson's views are clearly worthy of consideration. Surely 
they are at least as relevant as those of Thomas Jefferson, whose 
1802 letter to the Danbury Baptist Association has wielded such in-
fluence in American constitutional law (and, of course, Jefferson 
wasn't even in America when the Constitution or Bill of Rights were 
written or ratified). 
More significantly, virtually all of Wilson's contributions to the 
creation of American political institutions were influenced by his be-
lief that "the primary and the principle object in the institution of 
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government" is "to acquire a new security for the possession or the 
recovery of those rights, to the enjoyment or acquisition of which 
we were previously entitled by the immediate gift, or by the unerr-
ing law, of our all-wise and all-beneficient Creator. "85 Because he 
thought every person could know natural law "by our conscience, 
by our reason, and by the Holy Scriptures" and because he had a 
relatively optimistic view of human nature, he was led to embrace 
democracy with more consistency than any other major founder. 86 
He advocated, for instance, the direct, popular, and proportional 
election of representatives, senators, and the chief executive at both 
the federal and state levels. Also, he opposed property qualifications 
for voters and limitations on who could hold office. 
Although Wilson was a consistent advocate of democratic institu-
tions, he recognized that humans are corruptible; therefore, he did 
not rely uncritically on the goodwill of elected officials or the elec-
torate . Accordingly, he supported the separation of powers and 
checks and balances. Significantly, he argued that legislatures are lim-
ited in what they can do by "natural and revealed law," and tl1e con-
text of this claim suggests that he believed coutts could declare leg-
islative acts that did so to be void87 
Although Wilson supported judicial review, he objected to the ad-
dition of a bill of rights to the U.S. Constitution because he thought 
Congress was already limited by its enumerated powers and, more 
significantly, that a bill of rights would be dangerous. He argued that 
if an "attempt to enumerate [natural rights] is made, it must be re-
membered that if the enumeration is not complete, everything not ex-
pressly mentioned will be presumed to be purposefully omitted. "88 To 
address this problem, Madison proposed, and the states eventually 
ratified, the Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
Wilson's contributions at the federal convention and his view of 
judicial review and the Bill of Rights cannot be understood if one 
does not comprehend his theory of natural rights. The latter is best 
interpreted in light of the Christian natural law tradition. Because 
rights are based on a universal, transcendent conception of natural 
law, they must be protected against infringements from both mi-
norities and majorities . The primaty purpose of government is to 
protect these rights and to make positive law in accordance with 
natural law. Wilson's views on natural law and how it is known in-
formed his many significant contributions to the creation of the 
American republic. 
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CONCLUSION 
Space constraints prevent a more detailed discussion of the relation-
ship between Wilson's religious faith and his political theory and ac-
tions. In my book on Wilson, I attempt to flesh these out in detail and 
consider them in their proper historical context. Even the limited dis-
cussion of Wilson in this chapter, however, should make it clear that 
a strong case can be made that he was a serious Christian thinker. This 
suggests that contemporary scholars who simply ignore Wilson's reli-
gious language do so at great risk. Although it is possible to argue that 
all of Wilson's religious language was mere rhetorical flourish , it is 
troubling that many contemporary Wilson scholars do not even feel 
compelled to make such an argument. 
APPENDIX: OF LAWS 
Of law there are different kinds . All, however, may be arranged in two dif-
ferent classes. 1. Divine. 2. Human laws. The descriptive epithets employed 
denote, that the former have God, the latter, man, for their author. 
The laws of God may be divided into the following species. 
1. That law, the book of which we are neither able nor worthy to open. 
Of this law, the author and observer is God. He is a law to himself, as 
well as to all created things. This law we may name the "law eternal." 
2. That law, which is made for angels and the spirits of the just made per-
fect. This may be called the "law celestial." This law, and the glorious 
state for which it is adapted, we see, at present, but darkly and as 
through a glass: but hereafter we shall see even as we are seen; and 
shall know even as we are known. From the wisdom and the goodness 
of the adorable Author and Preserver of the universe, we are justified 
in concluding, that the celestial and perfect state is governed, as all 
other things are, by his established laws. What those laws are, it is not 
yet given us to know; but on one truth we may rely with sure and cer-
tain confidence-those laws are wise and good. For another truth we 
have infallible authority-those laws are strictly obeyed: "In heaven his 
will is done." 
3. That law, by which the irrational and inanimate pa1ts of the creation 
are governed. The great Creator of all things has established general 
and fixed rules, according to which all the phenomena of the material 
universe are produced and regulated. These rules are usually denom-
inated laws of nature. The science, which has those laws for its object, 
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is distinguished by the name of natural philosophy. It is sometimes 
called, the philosophy of body. Of this science, there are numerous 
branches. 
4. That law, which God has made for man in his present state; that law, 
which is communicated to us by reason and conscience, the divine 
monitors within us, and by the sacred oracles, the divine monitors with-
out us. This law has undergone several subdivisions, and has been 
known by distinct appellations, according to the different ways in which 
it has been promulgated, and the different objects which it respects. 
As promulgated by reason and the moral sense, it has been called 
natural; as promulgated by the holy scriptures, it has been called re-
vealed law. 
As addressed to men, it has been denominated the law of nature; as ad-
dressed to political societies, it has been denominated the law of nations. 
But it should always be remembered, that this law, natural or re-
vealed, made for men or for nations, flows from the same divine source: 
it is the law of God. 
Nature, or, to speak more properly, the Author of nature, has done much 
for usi but it is his gracious appointment and will, that we should also do 
much for ourselves. What we do, indeed, must be founded on what he has 
done; and the deficiencies of our laws must be supplied by the perfections 
of his . Human law must rest its authority, ultimately, upon the authority of 
that law, which is divine. 
Of that law, the following are maxims-that no injury should be done-
that a lawful engagement, voluntarily made, should be faithfully fulfilled. We 
now see the deep and the solid foundations of human law. 
It is of two species. 1. That which a political society makes for itself. This 
is municipal law. 2. That which two or more political societies make for 
themselves. This is the voluntary law of nations. 
In all these species of law-the law eternal-the law celestial-the law 
natural-the divine law, as it respects men and nations-the human law, as it 
also respects men and nations-man is deeply and intimately concerned. Of all 
these species of law, therefore, the knowledge must be most important to man. 
Those parts of natural philosophy, which more immediately relate to the 
human body, are appropriated to the profession of physick. 
The law eternal, the law celestial, and the law divine, as they are disclosed 
by that revelation, which has brought life and immortality to light, are the 
more peculiar objects of the profession of divinity. 
The law of nature, the law of nations, and the municipal law form the ob-
jects of the profession of law. 
From this short, but plain and, I hope, just statement of things, we perceive 
a principle of connexion between all the learned professions; but especially 
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between the two last mentioned. Far from being rivals or enemies, religion 
and law are twin sisters, friends, and mutual assistants . Indeed, these two sci-
ences run into each other. The divine law, as discovered by reason and the 
moral sense, forms an essential part of both. 
From this statement of things, we also perceive how important and digni-
fied the profession of the law is, when traced to its sources, and viewed in 
its just extent. 
The immediate objects of our attention are, the law of nature, the law of na-
tions, and the municipal law. On the two first of these three great heads, I shall 
be very general. On the last, especially on those parts of it, which comprehend 
the constitutions and publick law, I shall be more particular and minute. 
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